A Repeated Game Formulation of Energy-Efficient Decentralized Power Control

Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through multiuser interference) several times. It is shown that the corresponding conflict of interest can have a predictable outcome, namely a finitely or discounted repeated game equilibrium. Remarkably, it is shown that this equilibrium is Pareto-efficient under reasonable sufficient conditions and the corresponding decentralized power control policies can be implemented under realistic information assumptions: only individual channel state information and a public signal are required to implement the equilibrium strategies. Explicit equilibrium conditions are derived in terms of minimum number of game stages or maximum discount factor. Both analytical and simulation results are provided to compare the performance of the proposed power control policies with those already existing and exploiting the same information assumptions namely, those derived for the one-shot and Stackelberg games.Comment: 25 pages, 5 figures, accepted for publication in IEEE Transaction on Wireless Communicatio

Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder

We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder's distortion function. The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder's distortion mismatch. When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder's belief on the source statistics

Approche bayésienne pour le contrôle de puissance décentralisé efficace énergétiquement

Nous considérons la liaison montante d'un réseau avec N transmetteurs mobiles et un seul récepteur (canal à accès multiple) à travers les jeux Bayesiens et les jeux à information incomplete

Coverage games in small cells networks

This paper considers the problem of cooperative power control in distributed small cell wireless networks. We introduce a novel framework, based on repeated games, which models the interactions of the different transmit base stations in the downlink. By exploiting the specific structure of the game, we show that we can improve the system performance by selecting the Pareto optimal solution as well as reduce the price of stability

Implicit cooperation in distributed energy-efficient networks

International audienceWe consider the problem of cooperation in distributed wireless networks of selfish and free transmitters aiming at maximizing their energy-efficiency. The strategy of each transmitter consists in choosing his power control (PC) policy. Two scenarios are considered: the case where transmitters can update their power levels within time intervals less than the channel coherence time (fast PC) and the case where it is updated only once per time interval (slow PC). One of our objectives is to show how cooperation can be stimulated without assuming cooperation links between the transmitters but only by repeating the corresponding PC game and by signals from the receiver. In order to design efficient PC policies, standard and stochastic repeated games are respectively exploited to analyze the fast and slow PC problems. In the first case a cooperation plan between transmitters, that is both efficient and relies on mild information assumptions, is proposed. In the second case, the region of equilibrium utilities is derived from very recent and powerful results in game theory

Contrôle de puissance dynamique pour les communications sans fils

Nous étudions un problème de contrôle de puisssance pour les systèmes de communications sans fils. Nous formulons un problème d'optimisation dynamique sous containtes dynamiques et caracterisons des puissances optimales et les équilibres pour des canaux incertains et des coûts de consommation quadratique

Coding Theorems for Empirical Coordination: Technical Report

https://cloud.ensea.fr/index.php/s/X9e5x8EzJfI7I4